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In the opening pages of her groundbreaking book 
Dependent States, cultural historian Karen Sánchez-
Eppler clears a path for children’s literature critics 
interested in challenging the notion that children 
function solely as passive recipients of culture. Without 
dismissing the key insights generated by Jacqueline 
Rose and other literary critics who treat childhood 
strictly “as a discourse among adults” (xvi), Sánchez-
Eppler nevertheless announces her intention to regard 
children not merely as objects of socialization but also 
as “individuals inhabiting and negotiating” societal 
conceptions of what it means to be a child (xv). She 
thus sets out to analyze not just how American adults 
in the nineteenth century represented children but 
also how children represented themselves. To pay 
attention to children’s diaries and other similar sources, 
she stresses carefully, “is not to pretend that children 
are fully independent actors, unhampered by the 
constraints of adult regulation and desire; but neither 
is it to see children as incapable of defining their own 
terms and grounds of power and meaning” (xxviii).
I agree with the idea that not just literary critics but 
also everyone who participates in the interdisciplinary 
field of childhood studies should try to chart a middle 
course of this kind. That said, Sánchez-Eppler’s account 
leaves open the question of exactly what kind of 
agency younger people have and how it compares to 
the sort generally belonging to older people.1 In what 
way do children “defin[e] their own terms and grounds 
of power and meaning”? Sánchez-Eppler frames her 
intervention in negative terms—children are neither 
independent nor incapable—and describes young 
people in the most neutral language possible, referring 
to them not as agents, or actors, or co-creators of 
culture but merely as “individuals” who start off their 
lives in a state of dependency. The bones of a theory 
about what it means to be a child are here, but there 
is no metaphorical meat on them. Or, to return to my 
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earlier analogy, the middle ground Sánchez-Eppler 
wants to inhabit remains mostly unmapped.
As a result, Sánchez-Eppler tends to tack back and 
forth between the two extremes she hopes to avoid. 
Keenly attuned (and rightly so) to the primacy and 
clout of grown-ups, she veers strongly toward the 
“incapable child” pole: the bulk of Dependent States 
focuses on “how structural and institutional power 
is enacted” on young people by their elders (xxiii), 
often resulting in “the abuse and death of individual 
children” (151). On the relatively rare occasions when 
she analyzes children’s words and deeds, by contrast, 
Sánchez-Eppler swings back toward the “independent 
child” pole, as when she remarks on “the difficulties 
of disentangling the experiences of children from 
the discourses of childhood” (xxvii). This formulation 
suggests that somewhere—underneath all the grown-up 
interference—a pure signal pulses that originates solely 
from the child. Yet, since selfhood itself is shaped by 
language taught to us by others, shouldn’t scholars who 
analyze children’s writing resist the temptation to sort 
out which sentiments expressed in child-authored texts 
are truly attributable to young authors and which to the 
adults who surround them? After all, adult discourse is 
not a cloak that covers up some true, essential child; 
it is a constituting factor.2 But if we are barred from 
speculating about the degree to which adult pressure 
manifests itself in child-authored texts, then we cannot 
distinguish between, say, a passionate fan letter in 
which a child assures an actress she “adores” that 
“[n]obody knows I am writing to you, not even my 
mother” (qtd. in Bold 171) and the kind of rote note a 
schoolchild pens to an author that adheres to a teacher-
approved formula.3 That seems problematic, too.
Because of the complexity of this issue and 
the challenges of tracking down child-generated 
documents from the distant past, it is tempting to 
dismiss the goal of locating children’s agency as a 
“flawed intellectual project” (Alexander 123). That, 
I think, would be a mistake. But if childhood studies 
scholars want to continue talking about agency and 
analyzing children’s writing, then perhaps we should 
back up a step and articulate in positive terms a 
theoretical model of what it means to be a child. Such 
a schema could help us to generate a more specific 
account of what we mean when we say that children 
have agency, which could then enable us to tweak or 
transform whatever discipline-specific methodologies 
we use to guide our analyses of children’s words and 
actions. In this essay, I sketch out how this process 
might unfold under the aegis of what I call the “kinship 
model” of childhood. Let me stress from the start that 
this is not a schema I made up from scratch. Rather, 
it constitutes an attempt to develop the middle way 
toward which Sánchez-Eppler and others gesture—to 
name and flesh out a model of childhood that is 
already implicit in their work. For, despite the passage 
that I just quoted and queried, many other moments 
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in Dependent States make it clear that Sánchez-Eppler does not actually 
believe in the existence of an essential self unmediated by language and 
culture. She emphasizes—and I agree—that any account of what it means 
to be a child must acknowledge that human beings begin life in a state of 
dependency, immersed in discourses not of our own making that ineluctably 
affect how we conceive of ourselves and the world around us (xxv). If we as 
scholars want to claim that children have agency, then, we must concede 
that the kind of agency they have is not synonymous with autonomy.
Helpful as this insight is, however, it is still a negative formation:  
“Don’t equate children’s agency with autonomy.” Why is it so hard to 
generate positive theories about children’s agency? Partly because, as  
literary critic Anna Mae Duane points out, “Childhood studies, a field 
designed to dismantle inaccurate and often destructive definitions of 
childhood, has yet to come up with a consensus on what we mean when 
we say ‘child’ in the first place” (“Part One” 15). Even philosopher Gareth 
B. Matthews—a standout in his field because he pays sustained attention 
to children—refuses to philosophize on this subject, declaring that “no 
one today is in a position to present an altogether adequate theory of 
childhood that would command the respect of developmental psychologists, 
anthropologists, linguists, . . . educational theorists,” and so on (25). 
Speaking on a plenary panel on “The Futures of Childhood Studies” at the 
University of Notre Dame in December 2014, sociologist Daniel Cook 
characterized this collective reluctance to theorize not as a problem but as a 
positive benefit, a sign of the sensitivity of scholars in our field to the dangers 
of generalization. So, before we even begin trying to answer the question 
“What is a child?,” some preliminary queries demand our attention. Why 
have so many of us working in childhood studies been content to dispose, 
not propose? What legitimate concerns have held us back from hazarding 
positive theories about what it means to be a child?
“no one today is in a 
position to present an 
altogether adequate 
theory of childhood” 
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One reason why we have remained mostly silent 
on this subject, I think, is that we are justifiably 
uncomfortable with the idea that all children share 
essential characteristics that differentiate them 
decisively from adults. The categories “child” and 
adult” carve up the human community neatly into two 
separate and unequal classes of people. Yet most of 
us likely would agree that growth is actually a messy 
continuum, an ongoing process that involves losses 
as well as gains. Our capacities for reflectiveness, 
rationality, self-control—or whatever qualities we 
deem necessary before agents should be allowed to 
make their own choices free from parental (or in loco 
parentis) supervision—tend to develop gradually over 
time. But these capacities do not always and inevitably 
correlate with age: some twelve-year-olds may have 
them; some fifty-year-olds may not. Generalizing 
about what powers and abilities children do (or do 
not) have is problematic because children, like adults, 
are a heterogeneous bunch. To borrow and reapply 
an observation made by queer theorist Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick: “People are different from each other. It is 
astonishing how few respectable conceptual tools we 
have for dealing with this self-evident fact” (22).
Another excellent reason for adult reticence 
regarding the nature of childhood is the phenomenon 
that philosopher Ian Hacking dubs “the looping effect 
of human kinds” (59). Hacking points out that, when 
human beings are classified as belonging to a group 
that is considered to have (or lack) particular qualities, 
it can change the way they are treated as well as “the 
ways in which individuals experience themselves—and 
may even lead people to evolve their feelings and 
behavior in part because they are so classified” (104). 
Children as a group, Hacking observes, are subject to 
this looping effect:
Children are conscious, self-conscious, very 
aware of their social environment, less articulate 
than many adults, perhaps, but, in a word, aware. 
People, including children, are agents, they act, 
as the philosophers say, under descriptions. The 
courses of action they choose, and indeed their 
ways of being, are by no means independent of  
the available descriptions under which they may 
act. (103)
Hacking notes that targets of knowledge in the social 
sciences—“children,” “schizophrenics,” “women 
refugees”—are not fixed and immutable; they are 
instead “on the move” because the way in which 
different cultures in different times conceptualize 
such groups affects how their members conceive 
of themselves and interact with the world (108). 
But Hacking also stresses that this process is not 
unidirectional: the way that members of a group act 
can modify and transform the discourse, which is 
why he refers to such groups as “interactive kinds” 
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(103). Cultural historian Robin Bernstein makes a 
similar point when she encourages childhood studies 
scholars to acknowledge the “simultaneity and mutual 
constitution of children and childhood” (22). Adult 
discourse about what childhood is (or should be) 
shapes the lives and experiences of individual children, 
but that discourse is also shaped by the comportment, 
doings, and utterances of young people. Shifts in how 
adults talk about children can change how children 
behave, but how children behave can also shift how 
adults talk about them. Hacking’s looping analogy 
indicates his belief that this process resembles a 
roundabout more than a one-way street.
Or, if you will allow me to change metaphors 
midstream, we might say that both Hacking and 
Bernstein conceive of children as actors who are 
simultaneously scripted and scripting. This way 
of thinking about what it means to be a child has 
significant benefits. It accords children agency without 
denying that they are shaped by a classification that 
pre-exists their arrival in the world, one that has 
spawned a matrix of adult-controlled discourses 
and practices that affect how young people perceive 
themselves and their relationship to the world they 
inhabit. There is something powerfully egalitarian 
and respectful about Bernstein’s vision of children as 
“virtuoso performers” of childhood (28) and Hacking’s 
characterization of them as fully agential, just another 
group under the big tent “People” (103).
Yet while these formulations are very appealing, we 
may feel a nagging anxiety that, in general, children 
are more scripted and less scripting than grown-ups. At 
a 2012 symposium on “Performing Childhood Studies” 
at Texas A&M University, after Bernstein and I had both 
articulated visions of the simultaneously scripted-and-
scripting child, literary critic Lucia Hodgson objected, 
“Couldn’t you say the very same thing about adults?” 
Her concern has coloured my thinking on this subject 
ever since. Children, like adults, are different from 
one another. Nevertheless, human beings choose to 
categorize some people as children and others, not. 
Why? Part of the reason, I think, is that we worry 
that children’s capacity to “modify and transform the 
discourse” about the category “child” is generally more 
limited than adults’ capacity to interact with the groups 
(or kinds) to which they belong. 
Theorizing about what exactly the child-adult 
distinction is supposed to pick out, philosopher Tamar 
Schapiro observes, “To treat someone like a child, is, 
roughly, to treat her as if her life is not quite her own 
to lead and as if her choices are not quite her own to 
make” (715). I find this formulation very helpful. Rather 
than presume that adult paternalism toward children 
is ipso facto oppressive, Schapiro and other analytic 
philosophers invite us to consider when and why it is 
justified. One of Hacking’s reasons for coining the term 
“interactive kind” is his conviction that “[w]e need to 
make room . . . for both the [social] constructionist and 
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the biologist” when we study some of these groups (109). In the case of 
children, the biologist would likely point out that human beings begin 
life in a state of relative helplessness and inarticulateness. We are not 
born with the ability to take care of ourselves, speak on our own behalf, 
and make decisions about how to manage our own lives. Our survival 
and well-being depend on the mercy of caregivers who have more 
competencies and powers than we do.
Attuned to this power asymmetry, literary critics such as Rose and 
Perry Nodelman and sociologists such as Allison James have compared 
the adult-child relationship to colonization, urging us to carry over the 
insights gained from researching, theorizing, and writing about “the 
other”—in anthropology as well as in literary and cultural studies—to 
scholarship focused on children (Nodelman, “Other” 29; James 262). 
Useful as the metaphor of colonization has been, however, it tends 
to obscure the key problem we must grapple with when theorizing 
children’s agency: whereas British imperialists (for example) were wrong 
to claim that Indians and Africans were too immature to take care of 
themselves, most of us would likely agree that, in the case of very young 
children, some form of paternalism is not only justified but also ethically 
required. Comparing children’s status to that of colonized subjects, 
women under patriarchy, or queer people in a heteronormative culture 
has been (and continues to be) enlightening. But none of these analogies 
acknowledges that children enter the world in a state of dependency 
that makes it not merely justifiable but ethically incumbent upon their 
caregivers to treat them in ways that would seem offensively authoritarian 
if applied to other historically marginalized groups. If children are 
“other,” then, they are another kind of other.
But do we really want to embrace a vision of what it means to be a 
child that insists above all on the child’s alterity? Maybe not, because 
. . . children enter 
the world in a state 
of dependency that 
makes it not merely 
justifiable but ethically 
incumbent . . . to treat 
them in ways that 
would seem offensively 
authoritarian if applied 
to other historically 
marginalized groups.
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it seems risky to adhere to what I call the “difference 
model” of childhood (“Risky” 451). The history of how 
human beings have treated groups marked out as alien 
“others” suggests that this way of thinking too easily 
produces prejudice and injustice, condescension and 
dehumanization. Perhaps this is because human beings 
struggle to regard difference with complete neutrality; 
we tend either to valorize or to disapprove of it. Indeed, 
cultural historians such as James R. Kincaid and Marina 
Warner have shown us that, when adults conceive 
of children as a separate species, we often either 
idealize or demonize them—or both, since embracing 
a romanticized vision of children as “little angels” has 
often caused adults to regard young people who fail 
to live up to this punishingly high standard as “little 
monsters.” Moreover, even if we vow to remain neutral 
about the nature of the child’s alleged otherness, we 
nevertheless are liable to devalue it because we inhabit 
a profoundly “aetonormative” culture, meaning that—
however much we profess to adore young people—we 
generally regard adulthood as the normal and preferred 
state of being.4 The synonyms that the word “childish” 
brings to mind—silly, inept—attest to this point, as does 
the glaring absence of institutional archives that collect 
and preserve children’s writing (Sánchez-Eppler xvii). 
Yet any justification for paternalism would seem to 
rest on the widely shared intuition that children’s agency 
is somehow dissimilar: that “the words and deeds of 
children have a different status or significance than 
the words and deeds of adults,” making it acceptable 
to treat them as if their lives are “not quite [their] own 
to lead” (Schapiro 715–16). So it is worth thinking 
about what a difference-model approach to children’s 
agency would look like, if only to understand why we 
should rule it out and to help ourselves imagine better 
alternatives. To that end, we can use the difference 
model to generate the following theory: “Adults have 
one kind of agency; children have a different kind.” 
This purposely generic account clarifies matters by 
helping us to see that all theories of children’s agency 
that adhere to this basic format will fail to address the 
legitimate concerns outlined above regarding the act 
of theorizing about childhood. Why? First, because 
such theories draw too sharp a line between children 
and adults, thereby refusing to acknowledge human 
heterogeneity. Ironically, difference-model theories of 
children’s agency are too inattentive to difference, in the 
sense that they make no allowance for the possibility 
that some children might exercise the same sort of 
agency as some adults, or even outperform grown-ups 
as thinkers, doers, and writers.
Second, the inflexibility of this stance makes us 
more liable to treat children in ways that set into motion 
potentially disabling looping effects. If we adults do not 
conceive of young people as possible exercisers of the 
same sort of agency that we possess, then we are less 
likely to treat them in ways that help them to develop 
the competencies associated with that sort of agency. To 
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understand why this is so, imagine a parent committed 
to the difference-model view that adults are rational 
beings and children are emotional or instinctual ones. 
When a decision-making opportunity comes up, that 
parent is unlikely to share her own reasoning process 
with her child or to invite the child to participate in 
the weighing of pros and cons. After all, she believes 
that children, unlike adults, are wholly unamenable to 
rational persuasion. So she would have to be irrational 
herself to try to teach her child how to reason. As this 
counterfactual scenario suggests, conceiving of children 
as fundamentally different from adults can function 
as a self-fulfilling prophecy: adult assumptions about 
children’s alterity may lead older people to deprive 
younger ones of opportunities to exercise, learn about, 
or refine skills associated with the adult domain (in this 
case, rational deliberation, but this point holds true for 
whatever competencies we consider pertinent to the 
process of making one’s own life choices).
Having recognized that no difference-model theory 
of children’s agency is likely to assuage our legitimate 
concerns, we can now turn our attention to other 
kinds of accounts, like this one: “Adults have agency; 
children have less of it.” This is the type of theory we 
get if we adhere to what I call the “deficit model” of 
childhood, meaning that we take deficiency as our 
primary metaphor when we think about what it means 
to be a child. The moment we make this model explicit, 
however, we can see that any theory of agency that can 
be translated into these terms will likewise fail to address 
the legitimate concerns outlined above. To presume that 
children always have less agency than adults is to ignore 
Sedgwick’s point that “[p]eople are different from each 
other.” Even a quite young child might have considerably 
more agency than an adult, whether because of the 
vagaries of the developmental process (for example, 
neurodiversity) or because of social conditions that grant 
a particular kind or class of children more decision-
making power than adults around them who belong to a 
still more disenfranchised group.
Moreover, the existence of the looping effect means 
that, even if children of a certain age are generally 
deficient to adults in terms of how much agency they 
have, we should nevertheless resist the impulse to 
characterize their agency as partial and inferior because 
this description risks exacerbating, perpetuating, or 
even bringing into being the condition it claims only to 
describe. Social-science research on what is known as 
the “teacher expectancy effect” provides some support 
for this point, since it suggests that viewing children 
as deficient—as unable to grasp certain concepts or 
skills—can help produce the very incapacities we claim 
merely to describe.5
We can use the deficit model to generate a negative 
prohibition that represents the beginning of a plan 
for how to analyze children’s letters like the ones I 
mentioned near the start of this essay. Children’s letters 
should not be automatically regarded as intrinsically 
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less reliable than adult letters—not because age-related 
limitations and constraints never affect children’s writing 
in ways that we might need to acknowledge, but because 
it is essentialist, disrespectful, and potentially disabling to 
young people to presume that they always do. 
As should be evident by now, these models are 
meant to function more like tools than mirrors, and 
one thing that they enable childhood studies scholars 
to do is to clarify why we have generally chosen to 
dispose rather than propose, to dismantle problematic 
accounts of what it means to be a child rather than build 
better ones. When we try to theorize about childhood, 
we face a vexing double bind. On the one hand, it 
seems important to acknowledge the child’s original 
dependency and the limitations that attend routinely 
the state of being a biologically immature human being. 
After all, these limitations are what justify adults in 
treating children as children (not allowing four-year-olds 
to drive cars and sign contracts, for example). On the 
other hand, because adult discourse about childhood 
can function easily as a self-fulfilling prophecy, the 
moment we try to describe such limitations, we risk 
setting into motion a disabling looping effect whereby 
we perpetuate, contribute to, or even produce them. 
Childhood studies scholars have refrained from 
theorizing about what it means to be a child because 
we sense that it would be a mistake to take either 
deficiency or alterity as our governing metaphor when 
we hypothesize about this subject and because we 
worry that any theorizing will reify the category “child” 
by presuming a binary opposition between child and 
adult that is premised on biological essentialism and 
that ignores the fact that development is a messy and 
variable process affected by cultural and social—as well 
as by biological and physiological—factors.
But rather than allow such concerns to stop us from 
theorizing, suppose we try to come up with positive 
models of what it means to be a child that take these 
worries into account. Pace Matthews, I believe we can 
lay out an “adequate theory of childhood” that could 
appeal to scholars working on childhood in various 
disciplines—because I see such a model as already 
implicit in the work of a wide range of people, including 
philosophers such as Matthews and Hacking, cultural 
historians such as Sánchez-Eppler and Bernstein, and 
sociologists such as Alan Prout who have recently begun 
to move away from “bio-social dualism” and toward 
conceiving of childhood as a both-and phenomenon 
(Lee and Motzkau 8). I call it the “kinship model” of 
childhood. Adhering to this model means maintaining 
that children and adults are fundamentally akin to 
one another, even if certain differences or deficiencies 
routinely attend certain parts of the aging process. 
The concept of kinship encapsulates this delicate 
balancing act and, in so doing, helps us to perform 
it. Unlike models linked to analogies like “the child 
is an alien other” or “the child is a universal novice,” 
a schema built around the “child is kin” metaphor 
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prompts us to regard all human beings, regardless 
of age, as full subjects under the big tent “People.” 
Even as the concept of kinship highlights likeness 
and relatedness, however, it also makes room for 
difference and variation. Consider, for example, your 
own kinspeople: however closely related you are to 
other members of your family, you are unlike them, 
too. By its very existence as a mode of discourse 
about children, the kinship model assumes that 
young people have enough commonalities with each 
other—and differences from adults—to justify some 
form of adult paternalism and our continued use of 
the category “child.” Yet it also aims to function as 
the kind of conceptual tool that Sedgwick calls for by 
making room for the fact that children—like adults, 
women, and indeed all human groups—are such a 
diverse population that we can rarely (if ever) indulge 
in confident generalizations about them. To counteract 
the fact that having any model of what it means to be a 
child risks reifying the category and setting into motion 
disabling looping effects, adherents to the kinship model 
insist first and foremost on how alike younger and older 
people are. Only after emphasizing this elemental 
similarity do they acknowledge—using obstinately 
tentative language—the possibility of age-related 
differences and deficiencies.
Because we inhabit an aetonormative culture, 
stressing the similarities that link children and adults 
often involves a perspectival flip: instead of presuming 
that adults represent the norm and then investigating 
how children deviate from that norm, kinship-model 
adherents test out what happens if we regard the 
position that children generally inhabit as standard 
or shared. Consider agency, for example. Rather than 
assume that adults are full-fledged autonomous agents 
and then attempt to discern how children fail to live 
up to that standard, a kinship-model adherent is more 
likely to note that all human beings begin life in a 
compromised position, a state of dependency in which 
key decisions about who we are and how we live our 
lives are being made for us, affecting how we conceive 
of ourselves and the world around us.6 Even if we pick 
up many skills and abilities as we age that enable us to 
function more independently, we never fully outgrow 
that originally compromised state. So, the issue of how 
much agency a person has is always, at some level, a 
messy one.
A kinship-model theory of agency might therefore 
sound something like this: “Children, like adults, have 
agency, even if aspects of the aging process are likely 
to limit the form or degree of agency that they have.” 
In other words, having the kinship model enables 
childhood studies scholars to justify an impulse that 
was integral to the foundation of our field in its modern 
form: namely, the belief—shared by anthropologists, 
cultural historians, sociologists, and literary critics—
that scholars ought to attribute agency to children 
as social actors. Pace Duane, childhood studies did 
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not emerge solely because researchers wanted to 
dismantle bad accounts of childhood but also because 
they wanted to build better ones, often by treating 
children themselves not as “passive objects” but rather 
as valued “informants” whose voices had too often 
been “muted” (Hardman 87, 85). What the history of 
our field suggests, I think, is that adults who maintain 
that children have agency are more likely than ones 
who don’t to pay close attention to the words and 
deeds of young people, to seek out material traces of 
children’s agency that might otherwise go uncollected, 
unanalyzed, missing.
Speaking as someone who has spent many hours 
combing through archives, I can say that if I did not 
believe that a passionately worded, avowedly self-
motivated fan letter was more reflective of the writer’s 
thoughts and feelings than a classroom-generated, 
cookie-cutter memo, then I would not work so hard 
to dig up documents that resemble the former more 
than the latter. When I look back at my analyses of 
child-generated fan letters and reviews of Peter Pan, I 
notice that I adopted a kinship-model approach avant la 
lettre by assuming that I had the power to discriminate 
between more and less revealing documents on the 
basis of textual and contextual clues, much as I do 
when I analyze adult-authored texts. At the same time, 
however, I acknowledged that “any discussion of the 
preferences and practices of child playgoers raises 
serious epistemological problems,” including the fact 
that children very often (though not always) have less 
control over their theatre-related activities than adults 
(“Peter” 478). Rather than deny this complicating factor, 
I proposed, we can try to mitigate it by “collat[ing] 
different kinds of corroborative evidence, even as we 
acknowledge that our conclusions can only ever be 
tentative, since our knowledge is inevitably fractional, 
incomplete” (478). Instead of using children’s written 
reactions to plays such as Peter Pan to generalize in 
confident terms about what young people thought, we 
acknowledge that 
[d]ifferent children undoubtedly reacted in different 
ways to different productions, and most left no 
record at all of their responses. For others, writing 
long after the fact in memoirs, nostalgia may have 
distorted their recollections of youthful playgoing. 
Yet these problems should not arrest our inquiry; 
after all, they affect all attempts to trace audience 
reactions to productions from the distant past. . . . 
For this reason, a cautious humility should govern 
the kinds of claims we make about adult spectators, 
as well. (“Peter” 479)
There it is: the perspectival flip in action. But my point is 
not that I am the first or only childhood studies scholar 
to adopt this type of approach. Quite the contrary: 
I advocate for the kinship model because I think it 
encapsulates the best practices of many of us, including 
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historian Mary Jo Maynes (118), sociologists Priscilla Alderson and 
Tamaki Yoshida (77), and literary critics Sánchez-Eppler (xxv) and 
Beverly Lyon Clark (1–7, 13).
Even as the kinship model helps childhood studies scholars to 
make sense of our past, it gently nudges us to embrace an even more 
interdisciplinary future, since the kind of theories that it generates 
stake out some space for scholars whose disciplines equip them to 
hypothesize about age-linked limitations and differences, such as 
biologists and developmental psychologists. Speaking of intellectual 
equipment, you may be wondering what qualifies a literary critic like 
me to dabble in the philosophy of childhood. My rationale is that 
my field has trained me to isolate particular modes of discourse and 
to trace how they affect what people write, say, and do. Because of 
the existence of the looping effect, it genuinely matters what kind of 
language we use when we talk about children, particularly if we are 
credited with having any kind of expertise on this subject. History 
suggests that, when human beings think about what it means to be a 
child, we do so by means of analogy, and also that certain types of 
analogies are more potentially disabling than others. Articulating an 
amendable list of models of what it means to be a child can help us to 
mind our metaphors as we think, talk, and write about children.
If Sánchez-Eppler had been working with these models in 
Dependent States, for example, she might not have chosen to describe 
children as “partial subject[s]” (xxvii), a phrase fully in line with the 
deficit model since it implies that adults have things like subjectivity, 
agency, and voice, whereas children have less of them. When even 
the most cautious and astute scholars of childhood find it hard to 
steer clear of potentially disabling language, this difficulty attests, I 
think, to the value of having a positive model, one that is easier to 
. . . it genuinely matters 
what kind of language 
we use when we talk 
about children . . . .
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adhere to precisely because it relies on a metaphorically 
meaty concept such as kinship. Or consider the case 
of developmental psychologist Alison Gopnik, who 
has lucidly observed that “[o]ften, progress in science 
begins with finding the right analogy” (“Scientist” 
485). Gopnik has spent her career promoting the 
kinship-model theory that babies are less like mindless 
vegetables than fellow “scientists in the crib.” Yet she 
and her collaborators sometimes drift back to using 
deeply dehumanizing language to describe infants, 
describing them as “completely useless” (Philosophical 
71) or comparing them to aliens from another planet 
(Gopnik, Meltzoff, and Kuhl 2). Being familiar with 
the deficit, difference, and kinship models could help 
Gopnik and other scientists not only to weed out such 
inconsistencies but also to understand why it matters 
which metaphors we use.
The time has come to make a humbling admission. I 
began this piece by hinting that I would supply a more 
specific account of what childhood studies scholars 
might mean when we say that children have agency. 
Yet, as you may have noticed, the statement about 
children’s agency generated by the kinship model is just 
as generic as the ones produced by other models. Like 
Sánchez-Eppler, in other words, I have not managed to 
spell out exactly what I mean when I say that children 
have agency; all I have done is to explain the benefits of 
a particular type of account that, I claim, constitutes an 
improvement over two other kinds of accounts.
Bear with me, though, because I have several 
excellent excuses for this failure, the first of which 
applies both to me and to Sánchez-Eppler. Like 
the query “What is a child?,” “What is agency?” 
is a philosophical question, meaning that there is 
not yet any accepted methodology for how to go 
about answering it. Prout, for example, relies on 
Actor-Network Theory, while Bernstein makes use of 
postmodernist accounts of the performative nature of 
identity. Some analytic philosophers, following in the 
footsteps of G. E. M. Anscombe, define agency in terms 
of knowing what we are doing and why, while others 
such as Michael Bratman and Nomy Arpaly object that 
such accounts over-intellectualize agency.
My point is that there is no shame in struggling 
toward a solution to this problem rather than solving 
it completely. The fact that it is very difficult to define 
what agency is and that childhood studies scholars 
are unlikely to come to a consensus on this subject 
any time soon (if ever) does not mean that we should 
characterize the project of locating children’s agency 
as “flawed” (Alexander 123). Humanists and social 
scientists have grown so comfortable with the hyper-
skeptical intellectual style that literary critic Rita Felski 
calls “critique” that, when we do not know how to 
define something, our first impulse is, often, to discard, 
dismantle, or problematize it. Perhaps that is why 
sociologist David Oswell opens his thoughtful and 
informative book The Agency of Children by reassuring 
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readers that he will provide “not any kind of theory of 
children’s agency” but rather “open[] up the problem 
of children’s agency for further investigation” (8). I 
am all for further investigation, but I—along with 
many scientists and analytic philosophers—think that 
formulating positive hypotheses is a key part of the 
problem-solving process. 
So, until another childhood studies scholar proposes 
a better option, I suggest that we take a kinship-model 
approach when we theorize about children’s agency, 
thereby affirming, extending, and developing our field’s 
long-standing commitment to respecting children’s 
status as agents. Such a stance moves us away from 
the “hermeneutics of suspicion” that Felski describes 
so brilliantly and toward what we might call the 
hermeneutics of recuperation, a rigorous yet generous 
style of thinking that allows us to appreciate as well 
as criticize, believe as well as doubt, build and tinker 
as well as dismantle and deconstruct. That brings 
me to my second excuse for failing to offer my own 
account of children’s agency: namely, that I like the 
ones supplied by Hacking, Bernstein, Prout, and others. 
Adopting the kinship model does not require us to 
jettison the “child is actor” analogy they favour. On the 
contrary, it helps us to understand why it so appealing: 
precisely because it can be applied to agents of all 
ages without foreclosing the possibility that age-related 
differences and deficiencies might exist that ought to 
be acknowledged. Categorizing this way of thinking 
as a kinship-model approach does not commit us to 
affirming children’s competencies (such as the ability 
to resist social pressures) so much as it indicates our 
desire to find the least prescriptive way of admitting that 
various vulnerabilities, limitations, and constraints might 
attend particular parts of the aging process. 
My third and final excuse for not supplying a 
definition of agency is that my real goal here has been 
to answer the first question, not the second one: to lay 
out a new methodology for how to think about the 
question “What is a child?” My method, which was 
inspired by the work of philosophers such as Matthews, 
Schapiro, and David Archard, consists of articulating an 
amendable list of models of what it means to be a child 
that can be used by a wide variety of people. Viewed 
in this light, the fact that such models can generate 
content-neutral theories is a feature, not a bug, since 
such theories can then be used in different ways by 
scholars working in different disciplines. A recurring 
concern in childhood studies scholarship is the lack of 
communication and collaboration between researchers 
in the humanities, the social sciences, and the natural 
sciences. If enough of us agree to use them, then having 
models could help us to talk with (rather than past) one 
another. To put this point another way, a philosophy of 
childhood informed by work that has already been done 
in childhood studies could function as a bridge between 
disciplines, providing us with a shared language that 
could help our field become as interdisciplinary as it 
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aspires to be. Here, too, a more recuperative, tentative, 
and inclusive style of discourse could help us. If we 
want developmental psychologists to pay more attention 
to what the rest of us are saying, for instance, then 
we probably should not describe their discipline as 
“hegemonic” even as we voice the appeal (Thorne 150).
If any field could stand to put a little more distance 
between itself and the hermeneutics of suspicion, 
that field is children’s literature studies, as literary 
critic Richard Flynn has observed (65). Felski does not 
mention my disciplinary home in her account of how 
a “kudzu-like proliferation of a hypercritical style of 
analysis . . . crowded out alternative forms of intellectual 
life” during the last quarter of the twentieth century 
(10). But her description perfectly matches my memory 
of the late 1990s and the 2000s, when I was struggling 
to write and publish work that did not conform to the 
vision of how to think about children’s literature that 
Rose outlined in her 1984 manifesto The Case of Peter 
Pan, or the Impossibility of Children’s Fiction. What 
made Dependent States so groundbreaking in 2005 
was that Sánchez-Eppler treats children not only as the 
objects of adult efforts to socialize them but also as 
“participants in the making of social meaning” (xv). This 
both-and approach constitutes an implicit challenge 
to Rose’s radically negative declaration that “[t]here is 
no child behind the category ‘children’s fiction,’ other 
than the one which the category itself sets into place” 
(10). According to Rose, actual children are involved 
in children’s literature to such a minimal degree that it 
is probably best for literary critics to avoid all mention 
of them. After all, their input and influence over the 
production of children’s literature is negligible, and 
evidence regarding how they have responded to 
particular texts is not merely scanty but “more or less 
impossible to gauge” even when we find it (Rose 9).
Perhaps there is no need to criticize or to reject Rose’s 
paradigm, given that Sánchez-Eppler and many other 
scholars have managed to do their pioneering work 
without elaborating an alternative to it.7 Yet it bothers me 
that children’s literature critics are still working under the 
aegis of a theoretical framework that is such a poor fit for 
the innovative and often interdisciplinary work that so 
many of us are currently doing.8 Partly for this reason, I 
am in favour of articulating a positive alternative to Rose’s 
approach that situates children’s literature studies as 
one of the disciplines that together make up the broader 
field of childhood studies. If other children’s literature 
critics share my interest in this possibility, then we can 
use the philosophical schema that I have sketched out 
here to help our theory catch up with our practice. We 
can acknowledge that adults wield immense influence 
over children’s culture without going so far as to define 
children’s literature as “an adult practice” (Nodelman, 
Hidden 4). That Rose-inspired approach is fully in 
keeping with the difference model, since it draws a strict 
line of division between adults (who participate in this 
cultural phenomenon) and children (who do not).
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Notes
 1 Sánchez-Eppler’s reticence on this point is representative, not 
idiosyncratic. Sociologist Alan Prout has observed that the question 
of what it means to be an agent often goes unaddressed within the 
field of childhood studies (64–65). The editors of the 2016 volume 
Reconceptualising Agency and Childhood likewise stress this point 
(Esser et al., “Reconceptualising” 1, 7), even as they and their 
contributors help to remedy it. 
 2 My thinking on this point has been influenced by the work of 
Anna Redcay and Peter E. Cumming. 
 3 The first letter was written by a twelve-year-old girl named Lita 
to actress Hilda Trevelyan, who originated the role of Wendy in 
Peter Pan. Sara L. Schwebel introduces examples of the second 
type in her contribution to this forum.
 4 This useful term was coined and defined by Maria Nikolajeva (8).
I propose that we instead start from the kinship-
model premise that younger people, like older ones, are 
involved in various and complex ways with children’s 
literature. Once we acknowledge this underlying 
likeness, then we can focus on noticing differences, 
such as the fact that most—although not all—children’s 
literature is written by adults. For this reason, the 
important work of analyzing how adult-authored 
children’s texts disseminate ideologies that might prove 
harmful to minors should (of course) continue. But a 
new paradigm built on the kinship model of childhood 
would make room for other kinds of work, too, 
including the archiving and analysis of youth-generated 
online writing of the kind that cultural historian Sara L. 
Schwebel mentions in her contribution to this forum. 
The issue of how to curate and preserve such materials, 
she observes, requires our immediate attention. I agree 
and would add that interpreting such materials may well 
require us to elaborate new methodologies. The question 
is, should such work proceed under the aegis of a 
paradigm that characterizes youth involvement in youth 
culture as negligible, largely inaccessible, and virtually 
impossible to analyze? Or should we work together 
to create a more capacious critical framework that 
affirms our respect for children’s agency as participants 
in culture and helps us to develop theoretically 
well-grounded methodologies for analyzing their 
involvement? I am in favour of the second option, 
although I am also open to “the permanent possibility of 
someone’s having a better idea” (Rorty 349).
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 6 This aspect of the kinship model was inspired by Sánchez-Eppler’s 
observation in Dependent States that paying attention to childhood 
forces us
  to examine what it might mean to claim voice, agency, or  
  rights for a figure who is not, cannot, and indeed should not be  
  fully autonomous. Children’s dependent state embodies a  
  mode of identity, a relation to family, institution, or nation, that  
  may indeed offer a more accurate and productive model  
  for social interaction than the ideal autonomous individual of  
  liberalism’s rights discourse ever has. (xxv)
Duane elaborates and expands on this view and, in so doing, 
anticipates many key tenets of the kinship model (“Introduction” 
5–7).
 7 Literary critic Laurie Langbauer seems to adopt this position 
when she aligns herself appreciatively with scholars of juvenilia 
who devote their time “primarily to uncovering and conserving 
[children’s] writing” rather than hatching theories to guide our 
analysis of such texts (890). To my mind, though, the question is not 
“Should we generate theories?” but rather “Are we willing to own up 
to the implicit theories that are already informing our practices?”
 8 I am thinking here about the exciting work in progress of 
emerging scholars such as Victoria Ford Smith, Tyler Bickford, 
Meredith A. Bak, and Julian Gill-Peterson, as well as older 
scholarship by many critics, some of whom I have listed elsewhere 
(“Risky” 455). Richard Flynn anticipated this shift in 2011 (66).
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